Open source software: Motivation and restrictive licensing
Title | Open source software: Motivation and restrictive licensing |
Publication Type | Journal Article |
Year of Publication | 2007 |
Authors | Fershtman, C, Gandal, N |
Secondary Title | International Economics and Economic Policy |
Volume | 4 |
Pagination | 209-225 |
Publisher | Springer Berlin / Heidelberg |
ISSN Number | 1612-4804 |
Other Numbers | 10.1007/s10368-007-0086-4 |
Keywords | contributions, contributors, developers, incentives, license analysis, licenses, lines of code, loc, MOTIVATION, restrictive, scm, size, status, version history |
Abstract | Open source software (OSS) is an economic paradox. Development of open source software is often done by unpaid volunteers and the source code is typically freely available. Surveys suggest that status, signaling, and intrinsic motivations play an important role in inducing developers to invest effort. Contribution to an OSS project is rewarded by adding oneโs name to the list of contributors which is publicly observable. Such incentives imply that programmers may have little incentive to contribute beyond the threshold level required for being listed as a contributor. Using a unique data set we empirically examine this hypothesis. We find that the output per contributor in open source projects is much higher when licenses are less restrictive and more commercially oriented. These results indeed suggest a status, signaling, or intrinsic motivation for participation in OSS projects with restrictive licenses. |
Notes | "We employ a unique data set consisting of 71 open source projects hosted at the SourceForge web site. The 71 projects in the sample were chosen (in January 2000)" |
URL | http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10368-007-0086-4 |
Full Text |
- Log in or register to post comments
- Google Scholar
- BibTeX
- Tagged
- EndNote XML